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iii JOINT DOCTRINE TO INTEGRATE THEATER STRATEGIC PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL: SEARCHING FOR NEEDLES IN A HAYSTACK.
Current joint doctrine clearly defines how a combatant commander can develop plans, organize forces, and conduct psychological operations within operational and tactical realms. However, joint doctrine stops short of providing solid mechanisms and procedures to integrate theater strategic psychological operations at the national level and with other governmental agencies responsible for information activities.
A revision of joint publications: Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations (JP 3-08);
Joint Information Operations (JP 3-13); and Psychological Operations (JP 3-53) must occur to clearly define a coordination mechanism to integrate theater strategic psychological operations initiatives at the national level. More important, the revision of these joint publications will provide a common, complementary, and consistent body of guidance and procedures that designate a central agency to affect interagency coordination between theater and national levels as well as ensure combatant and joint task force commanders receive responsive interagency support.
iv 
Introduction
To support the achievement of theater strategic objectives and fully realize the ability to shape the psychological and information environment, combatant commanders must have a formalized doctrine, responsive coordination mechanisms, and a dedicated organization to integrate theater and interagency information activities at the national level. Current joint doctrine clearly defines how a combatant commander can develop plans, organize forces, and conduct psychological operations within operational and tactical realms.
However, joint doctrine stops short of providing solid mechanisms and procedures to integrate theater psychological operations at the national level and with other governmental agencies responsible for information activities.
Information operations, specifically psychological operations (PSYOP), are fully recognized and embraced by geographic Commander-in-Chiefs (CINCs) as key tools to shape and control the information battlespace. Using allocated PSYOP forces, the CINCs and their joint task force (JTF) commanders have been generally successful employing psychological operations at the operational and tactical levels, but integrating the theater plan with national level information activities and the ability to harness interagency information capabilities have historically proven difficult. This difficulty reduces the responsiveness and scope of theater strategic PSYOP initiatives and can ultimately degrade the effectiveness of operational and tactical information activities.
This paper defines information operations and strategic psychological operations, examines current doctrine to integrate and conduct theater strategic psychological operations, and provides case study examples of deficiencies in executing and integrating information activities. To improve integration of theater and national level information activities, this paper recommends refining joint doctrine to clearly designate coordination mechanisms and responsible organizations to ensure timely and responsive interagency support for theater strategic psychological operations. In the scope of this paper, I narrow the focus of information operations to what is commonly called influence operations or PSYOP. The terms psychological operations, influence operations, and information activities are used interchangeably throughout this paper. In addition, interagency and U.S. Government (USG) agencies are used synonymously.
Information Operations and Strategic Psychological Operations
Doctrine for joint information operations (IO), contained in Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, describes information operations as actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own. These actions apply across all phases of an operation, the range of military operations, and at every level of war.
i Joint doctrine divides information operations into six distinct functional capabilities and two IO related activities (Figure 1.) . JP 3-13 further delineates information operations into offensive and defensive information operations. Offensive operations include operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare (EW), physical attack/destruction, and special information operations (SIO), and may include computer network attack (CNA). Defensive operations include information assurance, physical security, operations security, counter-deception, counter-psychological operations, counterintelligence, electronic warfare, and special information operations.
As opposed to other information operations capabilities designed to protect information or destroy/disrupt information systems, psychological operations provide ii combatant commanders the capability to communicate with and influence the full range of target audiences from government leaders to the "man on the street". Psychological operations, as a key element of information operations, become an integral and viable means to influence friendly and belligerent states, competitors, and other actors in and out of the international state system.
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Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objective.
iii To maximize its effectiveness, the theater commander conducts psychological operations at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. PSYOP are a vital part of the broad range of U.S. political, military, economic, and informational activities. The non-lethal quality and versatility to reach state and non-state audiences make psychological operations a relatively low risk, effective means to either explain or achieve theater and national objectives.
Joint doctrine and its concept of centralized planning and decentralized operations afford the geographic CINCs considerable latitude to plan strategic information activities to enhance theater engagement and support the full range of military operations. However, it is in harnessing interagency support and integrating theater information activities with national policy where current doctrine falls short. A review of interagency coordination, information operations, and PSYOP joint doctrine reveals inadequacies in procedures that integrate theater strategic PSYOP activities at the national level.
Doctrine to Plan and Integrate Information Activities
Three joint publications: JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations VOL I/II; JP 3-13, Information Operations; and JP 3-53, Psychological Operations provide the basis for planning and integrating theater strategic information activities. These publications provide CINC and JTF staffs with generic guidance to plan strategic level psychological operations, integrate IO functional capabilities at theater level, and offer a rudimentary understanding of interagency operations. JP 3-08 would seem to be a logical start point for the theater IO or PSYOP planner to learn how the interagency coordination and integration process works. Although this joint publication goes to great lengths to explain why interagency coordination is important, it falls dramatically short in defining actual procedures. JP and defined doctrine should provide an explanation of how this coordination is effected. Lacking direction and a defined coordination mechanism, theater and interagency organizations could develop information activities that at best do not complement each other and in the worst case, send conflicting messages to the same target audience.
A final section on media operations is offered in Chapter III. This chapter suggests that the joint force commander (JFC) establish a civil information program to coordinate activity among, PSYOP, civil affairs, United States Information Service (USIS) ix officer, host country, and other appropriate agencies.
x Although this concept mentions coordination with the PSYOP element, this program is designed primarily for operational and tactical applications "in country" and leaves the impression that the JTF should establish this mechanism after deployment.
Armed with this information, the theater planner would next look at JP 3-13, Information Operations, for guidance to access interagency support or to integrate theater strategic information activities with national level information programs. JP 3-13 stresses that to ensure success and produce synergy of action, the theater or JTF must integrate IO capabilities and that during the conduct of an operation, information activities may be planned or executed by non-Department of Defense (DOD) forces, agencies, or organizations. In addition, it states that these activities must be thoroughly integrated, coordinated, and deconflicted with all other aspects and elements of the supported campaign or operation. Although stating the need for IO planners to identify Service, joint, and interagency IO capabilities available to the JFC for planning purposes to achieve effective "capability-to-target" match, JP 3-13 does not provide guidance as to who is responsible for requesting or integrating these capabilities. xv The closest JP 3-13 comes to defining integration responsibility is explaining that, "The CJCS validates joint IO as appropriate."
xvi In a later section, this publication loosely links this responsibility at the theater level by stating that, "The combatant commander submits appropriate mission need statements to the CJCS for validation." xvii To avoid confusion, this section must delineate an agency for coordination beyond validation and explain in clear terms how integration is conducted among theater, JCS, and other interagency organizations.
The third joint publication to assist the IO and PSYOP planner to integrate theater strategic PSYOP activities is JP 3-53, Psychological Operations. JP 3-53 provides the best guidance to identify responsibilities for interagency integration and theater strategic PSYOP program approval. However, it does not provide the clarity needed for the theater planner to seamlessly forward plans or requests to affect timely national level integration or receive responsive interagency support. The demise of OSI in the spring of 2002 eliminated the general officer, many staff officers, and returned the coordination process back to a pre-September timeframe. xxix Measuring timeliness alone, it appears that OSI, during its short existence, tied together the myriad of agencies and gained increased levels of DOD and interagency unity of effort.
Historical Case Studies: Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM and ALLIED FORCE
Although acknowledging that psychological operations are a powerful tool, the U.S. has grappled with its use-never realizing the full potential. Disparate integration and the lack of dedicated support organizations as well as doctrine, at the strategic level, have been the root causes for this deficiency. The U.S. approach has historically been one of ad hoc groups forming to address PSYOP, informational issues, and public diplomacy during periods of crisis. The very nature of ad hoc groups, working without defined procedures or organization, degrades the ability to integrate interagency assets and lengthens the time from planning to execution. Military doctrine needs to shift away from a focus on physical destruction as the primary tool of coercion to a more integrated view incorporating a range of tools chosen according to the desired outcome. This conflict was a conflict of perceptions. A critical deficiency for the Alliance was the lack of an integrated information strategy.
Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM.
xlii As illustrated in the case studies, incomplete doctrine contributes to and fosters ad hoc working groups as well as confused integration mechanisms. Ultimately, this degraded the timeliness of PSYOP support and did not allow the full use of DOD and interagency information capabilities. Providing resolution for this deficiency can only come from well defined joint doctrine that coordinates and integrates theater, interagency, and coalition efforts planned at national levels. Despite lessons learned, establishment of OSI has been the only visible effort made to enhance strategic PSYOP coordination or improve mechanisms that link the theater plan to interagency support and national level information activities.
Recommendations for Change
clearly define or explain the procedures for integrating theater strategic PSYOP initiatives and activities at the national level. More important, the three relevant joint publications do not provide a common, complementary, or consistent body of guidance and procedures that designate a central agency to conduct interagency coordination for information activities or interagency support. Although this author does not envision major changes, all three joint publications discussed earlier require additions in relation to IO and PSYOP.
In terms of operations conducted and lessons learned, the joint publications reviewed in this paper are in need of updating-JP 3-08 and 3-53 were published in 1996 with JP 3-13 written in 1998. Taking The result of this update will be a set of complementary documents that explains the need for interagency information activity coordination at the highest tier and focused integration procedures at the lowest. Moreover, corresponding and mutually supportive joint publications will remove confusion at the combatant commander and JFC level allowing the development of responsive, complementary theater and national information activities.
JP 3-08 Revisions. JP 3-08 requires modification that adds a section discussing the requirement to integrate IO-specifically between PSYOP and interagency organizations. Although JP 3-08, for security reasons, may not be able to discuss interagency information capabilities, it could define how theater or JTF planners can integrate plans and access interagency assets by using the appropriate joint staff and ASD organizations.
Representing the highest tier of integration, this joint publication would not only assist DOD PSYOP planners but also interagency organizations that desire the use of DOD military PSYOP capability. DOS is only one agency that stands to benefit from this doctrine update. For example, after military operations in Afghanistan conclude, DOS may require DOD PSYOP support to enhance the success of country team operations or activities.
JP 3-13 Revisions. JP 3-13 must complement JP 3-08 and provide better resolution of organizations responsible to integrate strategic PSYOP programs with interagency activities. It must define a mechanism to request interagency support for theater PSYOP programs. JP 3-13 needs to specifically mention that interagency support/liaison can be an important part of the commander's IO cell. The PSYOP plan format, provided in JP 3-13, also requires a section for considering interagency support and integration. Finally, this publication must expand its overall section on PSYOP to explain that interagency coordination and integration are critical to conduct effective and timely strategic psychological operations in support of theater or JTF operations.
JP 3-53 Revisions. A revised JP 3-53 will provide greater depth and understanding of psychological operations by adding sections that provide the IO or PSYOP planner with guidance to coordinate and integrate theater strategic PSYOP activities. In its current configuration, JP 3-53 is confusing and leads the reader to believe that interagency support, deconfliction, and integration are primary concerns only during peacetime operations. JP 3-53 must stress that interagency coordination is a critical process throughout the entire conflict spectrum. To this end, a diagram needs to be added that clearly defines responsible organizations and the interagency integration/request mechanism.
ASD(SO/LIC) Involvement. ASD(SO/LIC) and select interagency participants must play an integral role in refining joint interagency coordination, IO, and PSYOP doctrine. Described earlier, the current staffing and integration mechanism used by ASD(SO/LIC) should be adopted as doctrine and added, as appropriate, into the tiered doctrine concept. The agencies responsible for PSYOP planning, integration, and coordination, described in the present JP 3-53, correspond with the procedures currently used by ASD(SO/LIC).
To complement these updated documents, ASD(SO/LIC) must be adequately manned to ensure timely PSYOP coordination and interagency support. OSI, deactivated due to an alleged "turf battle" with DOD's existing public affairs office, must be renamed and reestablished. xlv The formation of an OSI-type organization was one of the recommendations on a recent Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) Defense Science Board Report on managed information dissemination. This report identified the requirement for this organization to coordinate all DOD information programs. The report also envisioned the organization to increase coordination between PSYOP forces and the CINC/JFC staffs, strengthen PSYOP capability to support U.S. strategic information programs, and effectively integrate these programs into activities with other USG agencies through a NSC Policy Coordinating Committee.
xlvi
Conclusion
The proposal for a reinvigorated effort to refine joint doctrine that coordinates theater and national level information activities is not grandiose, nor does it represent large outlays in equipment and personnel. It does, however, offer reasonable enhancements at a time when national security requires maximum involvement with limited resources to provide the information tools needed to accomplish theater and national information objectives.
Doctrine writing has never been flashy and many senior leaders, both military and civilian, are fixated on equipment procurement or providing funding increases to solve integration challenges. Although equipment and funding remain important to improve theater strategic PSYOP capabilities, it is only the through consistent joint doctrine that organizations will be able to formalize relationships, streamline coordination, and when necessary, grow in required strength to provide timely and responsive support to commanders operating at operational and strategic levels. xliii Annex V information obtained from Joint Military Operations Department PowerPoint Briefing: Political-Military Actions and "Interagency Coordination", Instructional Period: OPS III-3. Annex V is a CJCS initiative to improve interagency support to military operations. In August 1998, the CJCS directed USCINCSOUTH to include an interagency coordination annex in CONPLAN 6400. The Annex V concept was briefed to the National Security Advisor in August 1999. Several months later (November 1999) in a memorandum to the SECDEF, the President codified the NSC role in Annex V. Annex V provides a vehicle for CINCs to coordinate interagency activities and lay groundwork for potential coordination with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), ensuring integration of other instruments of national power into the DOD deliberate planning process. It also articulates the CINC's recommendations as entry and exit conditions for USG agencies during operations. Annex V is repackaged by OSD/JS working group as DOD input to USG advanced planning. Properly used, Annex V will provide theater PSYOP and information operations planners a mechanism to delineate and describe interagency assets desired to enhance theater or JTF operations. OPLANS are approved by the SECDEF prior to execution. Advanced identification of desired interagency integration in Annex V could streamline interagency support as requests for interagency involvement and related assets will not arrive at the appropriate approval organization separate from the CINC or JFC plan.
